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Abstract
Following the development of the selectionist theory of the immune system, there was an
attempt to characterize many biological mechanisms as being ”selectionist” as juxtaposed to ”in-
structionist.” But this broad definition would group Darwinian evolution, the immune system,
embryonic development, and Chomsky’s language-acquisition mechanism as all being ”selection-
ist.” Yet Chomsky’s mechanism (and embryonic development) are significantly different from
the selectionist mechanisms of biological evolution or the immune system. Surprisingly, there is
an abstract way using two dual mathematical logics to make the distinction between genuinely
selectionist mechanisms and what are better called ”generative” mechanisms. This note outlines
that distinction.
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1 Introduction
There is a simple, abstract, and logical way to classify four ways that ”universals” can give rise to
”particulars.” One might expect such an abstract classification to have little power to make interest-
ing or significant distinctions. Yet it does give a clear differentiation between what would be called
a selectionist mechanism and the generative mechanism of Noam Chomsky’s language-acquisition
faculty or universal grammar (UG). The purpose of this note is to spell out that distinction.
2 Selectionist mechanisms
There is a long tradition, growing out of biological thought, to juxtapose ”selectionist” mechanisms
to ”instructionist” (or Lamarckian) mechanisms ([28], [22], [11], [9], [10]). Originally the distinction
was drawn in rather general terms. In an instructionist or Lamarckian mechanism, the environment
would transmit detailed instructions about a certain adaptation to an organism, while in a selec-
tionist mechanism, a diverse variety of (perhaps random) variations would be generated, and then
some adaptations would be selected by the environment but without detailed instructions from the
environment.
The selectionist-instructionist juxtaposition gained importance with the development of the
selectionist theory of the immune system. [21] There is some ”generator of diversity” that generates
a wide variety of possible adaptations, and then interaction with the environment differentially
amplifies some possibilities while the others languish, atrophy, or die off. For instance, in the case of
the human immune system, ”It is estimated that even in the absence of antigen stimulation a human
makes at least 1015 different antibody molecules–its preimmune antibody repertoire.” ([1, p. 1221]
quoted in [20, p. 187]) Gerald Edelman has sharpened the selectionist definition and generalized its
application.
The long trail from antibodies to conscious brain events has reinforced my conviction
that evolution, immunology, embryology, and neurobiology are all sciences of recogni-
tion whose mechanics follow selectional principles. ...All selectional systems follow three
principles. There must be a generator of diversity, a polling process across the diverse
repertoires that ensue, and a means of differential amplification of the selected variants.
[12, p. 7367]
In particular, Edelman develops a selectionist theory of brain development.
[T]he theoretical principle I shall elaborate here is that the origin of categories in
higher brain function is somatic selection among huge numbers of variants of neural
circuits contained in networks created epigenetically in each individual during its de-
velopment; this selection results in differential amplification of populations of synapses
in the selected variants. In other words, I shall take the view that the brain is a selec-
tive system more akin in its workings to evolution than to computation or information
processing. [11, p. 25]
The key point is that the possibilities must be in some sense actualized or realized (e.g., as antibodies
in low concentration in the immune system) in order for selection to operate on and differentially
amplify or select some of the actual variants while the others languish, atrophy, or die off.
3 Selectionist vs. generative approaches to universal gram-
mar
What would the child’s language-learning faculty look like if it was selectionist in this sense? There
is a na¨ıve and a sophisticated selectionist account of language acquisition. In the na¨ıve account,
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the child would (perhaps randomly) generate a diverse range of babblings, some of which would be
differentially reinforced by the linguistic environment [36].
Skinner, for example, was very explicit about it. He pointed out, and he was right,
that the logic of radical behaviorism was about the same as the logic of a pure form of
selectionism that no serious biologist could pay attention to, but which is [a form of]
popular biology – selection takes any path. And parts of it get put in behaviorist terms:
the right paths get reinforced and extended, and so on. It’s like a sixth grade version of
the theory of evolution. It can’t possibly be right. But he was correct in pointing out
that the logic of behaviorism is like that [of na¨ıve adaptationism], as did Quine.[7, p. 53]
As noted, Willard Van Orman Quine adopted essentially this approach to language learning.
An oddity of our garrulous species is the babbling period of late infancy. This random
vocal behavior affords parents continual opportunities for reinforcing such chance utter-
ances as they see fit; and so the rudiments of speech are handed down. [35, p. 73]
It remains clear in any event that the child’s early learning of a verbal response
depends on society’s reinforcement of the response in association with the stimulations
that merit the response, from society’s point of view, and society’s discouragement of it
otherwise. [35, p. 75]
Since language users can generate a variety of rule-based grammatical sentences never before spoken,
the child would have to rather miraculously generalize the grammatical rules from the reinforced
variants. In order to be adequate as an explanation, a model needs to take seriously the speaker’s
rule-based competency.
There is a sophisticated version of a selectionist model for the language-acquisition faculty or
universal grammar (UG) which could be called the format-selection (FS) approach (Chomsky, private
communication). The diverse variants that are actualized in the mental mechanism are different sets
of rules or grammars. Then given some linguistic input from the linguistic environment, the grammars
are evaluated according to some evaluation metric, and the best rules are selected.
Universal grammar, in turn, contains a rule system that generates a set (or a search space)
of grammars, {G1, G2, . . . , Gn}. These grammars can be constructed by the language
learner as potential candidates for the grammar that needs to be learned. The learner
cannot end up with a grammar that is not part of this search space. In this sense, UG
contains the possibility to learn all human languages (and many more). ... The learner has
a mechanism to evaluate input sentences and to choose one of the candidate grammars
that are contained in his search space. [31, p. 292]
The idea is that after a sufficient stream of linguistic inputs, the mechanism would converge to the
best grammar that matches the linguistic environment. Since it is optimizing over sets of rules, this
model at least takes seriously the need to account for rule-based competency. Early work (through
the 1970s) on accounting for the language-acquisition faculty or universal grammar (UG) seems to
have assumed such an approach.
The earliest ideas were roughly as follows. Suppose that UG provides a certain format
for languages, that is, a specification of permitted types of rules and permissible interac-
tions among them. Any rule system satisfying the proposed format qualifies as a possible
human language. ... The mind employs certain primitive operations to interpret some
of the data presented to it as linguistic experience, then selects among the languages
consistent with this experience in accordance with an evaluation metric that assigns an
abstract value to each language. [4, p. 52]
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The problems that eventually arose with the FS approach could be seen as the conflict between
descriptive and explanatory adequacy. In order to describe the enormous range of human language
grammars, the range of grammars considered would make for an unfeasible computational load of
evaluating the linguistic experience. If the range was restricted to make computation more feasible,
then it would not explain the variety of human languages.
It was an intuitively obvious way to conceive of acquisition at the time for – among
other things – it did appear to yield answers and was at least more computationally
tractable than what was offered in structural linguistics, where the alternatives found in
structural linguistics could not even explain how that child managed to get anything like
a morpheme out of data. But the space of choices remained far too large; the approach
was theoretically implementable, but completely unfeasible. [7, p. 173]
Instead of the format-selection (FS) approach, the alternative principles and parameters (P&P)
approach ([3], [6], [5]) to universal grammar was then developed:
we no longer consider UG as providing a format for rule systems and an evaluation metric.
Rather, UG consists of various subsystems of principles; it has the modular structure that
we regularly discover in investigation of cognitive systems. Many of these principles are
associated with parameters that must be fixed by experience. The parameters must have
the property that they can be fixed by quite simple evidence, because this is what is
available to the child; the value of the head parameter, for example, can be determined
from such sentences as John saw Bill (versus John Bill saw). Once the values of the
parameters are set, the whole system is operative. [4, p. 146]
Our purpose here is to give an abstract conceptual differentiation of the P&P approach from the
sophisticated selectionist approach of the FS system (not to mention from the crude selectionism in
behaviorism or na¨ıve Darwinism).
Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini took a different approach to that differentiation. In
the process, they generated some controversy with evolutionary biologists by claiming that ”Skinner’s
account of learning and Darwin’s account of evolution are identical in all but name” or, to be
more precise, ”what is wrong with Darwin’s account of the evolution of phenotypes is very closely
analogous to what is wrong with Skinner’s account of the acquisition of learned behavior.” [17, p.
xvi] They emphasize aspects of what is broadly called the ”neo-neo-Darwinism,” Evo Devo, or the
”extended evolutionary synthesis” [34]. Instead of wading into that controversy, we take the different
approach in this note of showing how selectionist mechanisms (e.g., FS) and ”generative” P&P-type
mechanisms can be differentiated at a very abstract logico-mathematical level. Hence we must turn
to a recent development in mathematical logic.
4 The two dual forms of mathematical logic
George Boole [2] originally developed what might be called Boolean logic as the logic of subsets, not
the logic of propositions. The interpretation solely in terms of propositions and the name proposi-
tional logic came later.
The algebra of logic has its beginning in 1847, in the publications of Boole and De
Morgan. This concerned itself at first with an algebra or calculus of classes, to which
a similar algebra of relations was later added. Though it was foreshadowed in Boole’s
treatment of ”Secondary Propositions,” a true propositional calculus perhaps first ap-
peared from this point of view in the work of Hugh MacColl, beginning in 1877. [8, pp.
155-156]
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When Boolean logic is interpreted as the logic of subsets, then variables stand for subsets of some
given universe set U , the operations are subset operations, and a (subset-)valid formula or (subset-
)tautology is a formula so that no matter what subsets of U are substituted for the variables, the
whole formula will evaluate to U for any non-empty U . It is then a theorem (known to Boole), not
a definition, that it suffices to consider on the case where U = 1 is a singleton which has only two
subsets 1 and ∅ (the empty set). Hence validity in the special case of propositions with the two
truth-values 1 and 0, i.e., truth-table validity, is equivalent to general subset-validity. Eventually, the
special case of propositional variables came to dominate so truth-table validity became the definition
of a tautology rather than a theorem about subset-validity (see any contemporary logic textbook).
What is lost by this focus on the special case of propositional logic rather than the general case of
subset logic? Around the middle of the twentieth century, the theory of categories was formalized [13]
and an older informal notion of duality in algebra was formalized as the reverse-the-arrows duality
of category theory [26]. The older informal duality in algebra was the juxtaposition of subgroups to
quotient groups, subrings to quotient rings, and in general subobjects to quotient objects–which in
the basic case of sets was the juxtaposition of subsets to quotient sets (the latter being equivalent
to equivalence relations or partitions on a set). For instance, F. William Lawvere calls the general
notion of a subobject a ”part” and “The dual notion (obtained by reversing the arrows) of ‘part’ is
the notion of partition.” [25, p. 85] Hence when the special case of ”propositional” logic is seen as the
general logic of subsets, then the idea arises of there being a dual logic of quotient sets or partitions
([15], [16]). That idea of a dual logic does not arise when subset logic is seen only as propositional
logic since ”propositions” do not have a category-theoretic dual.
5 The two lattices of subsets and partitions
The two logics of subsets and partitions are represented algebraically by the Boolean algebra of
subsets of a universe U and the algebra of partitions on a universe set U (|U | ≥ 2). For our purposes,
it suffices to consider the two lattices, the familiar Boolean lattice of subsets of U (where the partial
order is inclusion) and the lattice of partitions on U where the partial order is the ”refinement”
relation between partitions.
A partition pi = {B} on a universe U is a set of nonempty blocks B that are disjoint and whose
union is U . Given two partitions pi = {B} and σ = {C} on U , the partition pi refines the partition σ,
written σ  pi, if for every block B ∈ pi, there is a block C ∈ σ such that B ⊆ C. Figure 1 illustrates
the two lattices for the universe U = {a, b, c} (where the partial order is indicated by the lines).
Figure 1: Lattices of subsets and partitions
Each lattice has a top and bottom and that gives us the four universals in our title. In the Boolean
lattice of subsets, the top is the universe set U and the bottom is the null set ∅. In the lattice of
partitions, the top is the discrete partition 1 = {{u} : u ∈ U} where all blocks are singletons, and
the bottom is the indiscrete partition 0 = {{U}} with only one block consisting of the universe U .
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The duality between subsets of a set and partitions on a set extends to the extensive analogies
between the elements of a subset and the distinctions of a partition, where a distinction or dit of a
partition pi = {B} on U is an ordered pair (u, u′) ∈ U ×U of elements in different blocks of pi. There
is a set-theoretic representation of the lattice of partitions where each partition is represented by its
set of distinctions or ditset:
dit (pi) = {(u, u′) : ∃B,B′ ∈ pi;B 6= B′;u ∈ B;u′ ∈ B′},
and where the partial order is just inclusion between ditsets since:
σ  pi iff dit (σ) ⊆ dit (pi).
The complement of a ditset is the set of indistinctions of the partition:
indit (pi) = U × U − dit (pi) = {(u, u′) : ∃B ∈ pi;u, u′ ∈ B}
which is simply the equivalence relation associated with the partition. The ditsets of partitions on
U are thus the complements of equivalence relations on U and they might be called the partition
relations on U .
Given any subset S ⊆ U×U , its reflexive-symmetric-transitive or rst closure cl (S) is the smallest
equivalence relation containing S (which is well-defined since the intersection of two equivalence
relations is an equivalence relation). But it might be noted that this closure operation is not a
topological closure operation since the union of two rst-closed sets is not necessarily rst-closed. The
interior int (S) of a subset S ⊆ U × U is the complement of the rst-closure of the complement, i.e.,
int (S) = cl (Sc)
c
, so it is the ditset of some partition. To define the partition operation corresponding
to any logical subset operation (e.g., union, intersection, conditional, etc.), apply the subset operation
to the ditsets of the partitions, take the interior of the result, and then the partition corresponding
to that interior. For instance, the meet pi∧σ of two partitions pi and σ may be defined by the ditset:
dit (pi ∧ σ) = int [dit (pi) ∩ dit (σ)].
Thus we can take any formula of subset logic and interpret it as a formula of partition logic. The
atomic variables would represent partitions on U instead of subsets of U . Given such an interpretation
of a formula Φ (pi, σ, ...), an member u ∈ U being an element of the subset represented by Φ (pi, σ, ...)
is analogous to an ordered pair (u, u′) being a distinction of the partition represented by Φ (pi, σ, ...).
The two definitions of a valid formula are also analogous. A formula Φ (pi, σ, ...) is a valid formula
of subset logic, i.e., a tautology, if for any subsets of U substituted for the variables, the formula
evaluates to the set of all possible elements U (the top of the lattice) for any U (|U | ≥ 1). Similarly, a
formula Φ (pi, σ, ...) is a valid formula of partition logic, i.e., a partition tautology, if for any partitions
on U substituted for the variables, the formula evaluates to the partition that makes all possible
distinctions, i.e., the top-of-the-lattice discrete partition 1 with the ditset dit (1) = U × U −∆ (∆
is the diagonal {(u, u) : u ∈ U}), for any U (|U | ≥ 2).
The following Figure 2 summarizes the dual relationships between the two logics (see [15] or [16]
for more on partition logic).
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Figure 2: Dual analogies between the subset and partition logics
6 Four ways to go from universal to particular
In the two lattices of the dual logics, there are four universals, the tops and bottoms of the two
lattices. The four logico-mathematical ways to abstractly characterize going from universal to par-
ticular are the four ways of going from one of the universals to a particular subset or partition in
the lattice. In view of the duality between elements and distinctions, the four ways can be charac-
terized as: (1) killing off elements, (2) creating elements, (3) killing off distinctions, and (4) creating
distinctions.
If S represents any particular subset of U and pi represents any particular partition on U , then
the four ways are:
1. the selectionist mechanism U → S: to go from the universe set U to a particular subset S by
”selecting” the elements of S and eliminating or ”killing off” the elements of the complement
Sc;
2. the creationist mechanism ∅ → S: to go from the empty set ∅ to a particular subset S by
”creating” the elements of S;
3. the identification (or classification or symmetry-making) mechanism 1 → pi: to go from the
discrete partition 1 to a particular partition pi by identifying elements (”killing off” distinctions)
of U (in a consistent way); and
4. the generative (or symmetry-breaking) mechanism 0 → pi: to go from the indiscrete partition
0 to a particular partition pi by ”generating” distinctions on U (in a consistent way).
The four schemes can be related in terms of duals (the elements-distinctions duality) and oppo-
sites (all versus none) as in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The dual & opposite relations between the four schemes
A selectionist (U → S) mechanism and a generative (0 → pi) mechanism are related by taking the
dual and the opposite (in either order).
6.1 The selectionist mechanism: From universe set to a subset
The first scheme U → S is the abstract logico-mathematical model of a selectionist process since
it starts with an actualized set of diverse alternatives U and then a number of the alternatives are
eliminated by some fitness criterion or evaluation metric while the remaining alternatives are selected
(e.g., by differential amplification).
Figure 4: From the universe set U to a particular subset S
The original example of a selectionist process is Darwinian evolution where the set of diverse
alternatives is generated over time by random genetic mutations and then the environment applies a
fitness filter (see [17] on the general generate-and-filter idea). In the application to the immune sys-
tem, the actualized set of diverse alternatives are the generated set of antibodies in low concentration
and then the selectionist process differentially amplifies those that fit an invading antigen. Gerald
Edelman’s various selectionist models [11] also fit this scheme. One of Peter Medawar’s metaphors
for a selectionist scheme was a jukebox where all the tunes were already actualized as records in the
jukebox and then one was selected. In the format-selection or FS approach to universal grammar,
the mental mechanism must generate some representation of the diverse variety of grammars, and
then a chunk of linguistic experience is evaluated according to some evaluation metric to find the
best fit among the various systems of rules.
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6.2 The creationist mechanism: From empty set to a subset
The second scheme ∅ → S is the abstract logico-mathematical model of a creation story where
elements are, in effect, created out of nothing. While this is one type of ”creation story,” the Big
Bang creation theory [32] is modelled not by this ∅ → S scheme but by the generative 0→ pi scheme
where the making of distinctions is rendered as symmetry-breaking. The ∅ → S scheme is perhaps
the least interesting to model actual processes.
Figure 5: From the empty set ∅ to a particular subset S
6.3 The identification mechanism: From discrete partition to a partition
The third scheme 1→ pi is the abstract logico-mathematical model of any classification, partitioning
[24, p. 82], or quotienting process that proceeds by making consistent identifications (”consistent”
means that the identifications must be reflexive, symmetric, and transitive to form an equivalence
relation).
Figure 6: From the discrete partition 1 to a particular partition pi
For instance, the classification of animals to species where 1 represents each animal by itself and
pi represents the partition of the set of animals as to species. Mathematically, the action of a group on
a set is automatically reflexive, symmetric, and transitive so it defines an equivalence relation where
the equivalence classes are called ”orbits” [27, p. 99]. This 1 → pi scheme is ”symmetry-making”
while the opposite scheme 0→ pi is ”symmetry-breaking.”
6.4 The generative mechanism: From indiscrete partition to a partition
The fourth scheme 0→ pi is the abstract logico-mathematical model of any generative process where
a number of different outcomes (represented by the blocks of pi) can be generated by consistently
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making distinctions (”consistent” means nothing can be distinguished from itself, distinguishing
must be symmetric, and if u is distinguished from u′ and u = u1, u2, ..., un = u
′, then one of the
pairs (ui, ui+1) must also be distinguished for i = 1, ..., n−1, all of which means the set of distinctions
must be anti-reflexive, symmetric, and anti-transitive, i.e., a partition relation).
Figure 7: From the indiscrete partition 0 to a particular partition pi
The most ”atomic” type of distinction is a binary partition of the single block {U} ∈ 0 into two
blocks and then the binary partitions can be combined or joined together. The join pi ∨ σ of two
partitions pi = {B} and σ = {C} is the partition of nonempty intersections B ∩ C (or, in terms of
ditsets, dit (pi ∨ σ) = dit (pi) ∪ dit (σ), where the interior is not needed since a union of partitions
relations is always a partition relation). And the most ”efficient” binary partition is one that divides
the block {U} into two equal parts (assuming an even number of elements). The classic example is
where U has 2n elements which can be enumerated using n-place binary numbers. Then U can be
divided into two equal parts by the binary partition according to whether the ith binary digit is 0
or 1. The join of those binary partitions for i = 1, ..., n would go from the indiscrete partition 0 all
the way to the discrete partition 1, so the n equal-binary partitions are Shannon’s n bits [14].
Often a 0 → pi generative process proceeds not only by joining binary partitions (with not
necessarily equal blocks) but by designating one of the blocks as in the game of twenty questions
where the block with the yes-answer to the yes-or-no question is designated. In this case, the 0→ pi
process goes not just from the indiscrete partition 0 to a particular partition pi but from the single
block {U} ∈ 0 to a specific block B ∈ pi (like a correct answer in the game of twenty questions) by
following the yes-branches on the binary tree. This is the case of the generative mechanism that is
of most interest for our purposes.
A binary partition with a designated block is just a choice with two options, and it might be
represented by a switch with a neutral setting (representing the state before the choice is made) and
then two options such as a Left Option and a Right Option.
Figure 8: Switch to go from Neutral to either Left or Right Options
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For instance consider the example where U has 8 = 23 elements represented by the 3-digit binary
numbers b3b2b1. There would be three switches for i = 1, 2, 3 where the two options for the i
th switch
are a 0 or 1 in the ith place bi of the 3-digit binary number. Then the initial state is the indiscrete
partition 0 = {U} where all the switches are in neutral. The first switch (controlling the first digit
on the right) determines the binary partition with one block having the four elements b3b20 (Left
Option) and the other block having the four elements b3b21 (Right Option), and so forth for the
other two switches. When all three switches have been set one way or the other, that determines
the transition from the single block {U} ∈ 0 to a specific singleton block represented by a specific
3-digit binary number.
Our principal application of the 0 → pi generative scheme is Chomsky’s principles and param-
eters (P&P) description of the language-acquisition faculty or universal grammar ([3], [6], [5]). In
our simple model, the parameters are represented by the switches that can be moved to the left or
right (from the original setting of neutral) by the child’s linguistic experience, and the underlying
principles are expressed in the whole setup defining the grammatical meaning of the left and right
settings.
A simple image may help to convey how such a theory might work. Imagine that a
grammar is selected (apart from the meanings of individual words) by setting a small
number of switches–0, say–either ”On” or ”Off.” Linguistic information available to the
child determines how these switches are to be set. In that case, a huge number of different
grammars (here, 2 to the twentieth power) will be prelinguistically available, although a
small amount of experience may suffice to fix one. [18, p. 154]
Needless to say, this imagery implicitly allows for a neutral setting on the switches (sometimes
called the ”initial state S0”) since otherwise the original or ”factory” setting of the switches would
determine a specific grammar independent of experience.
Borrowing an image suggested by James Higginbotham, we may think of UG as an
intricately structured system, but one that is only partially ”wired up.” The system is
associated with a finite set of switches, each of which has a finite number of positions
(perhaps two). Experience is required to set the switches. When they are set, the system
functions. The transition from the initial state S0 to the steady state Ss is a matter of
setting the switches. [4, p. 146]
Another implication of this general type of 0 → pi model for Chomsky’s language-acquisition
faculty is the interpretation of the adjective ”universal” in the phrase ”universal grammar.” It does
not mean a specific grammatical rule common to all languages (which would be a subset-logic
interpretation of ”universal”).
The switch-settings of the metaphor above are in Chomsky’s terminology the ”param-
eters” defined by universal grammar. Notice that this image underscores the sense in
which universal grammar, the initial state of the language-learner, need not comprise an
account of what languages have in common–to continue the metaphor, different switch-
settings could give rise to very different grammatical system. [18, p. 154]
7 Generative versus selectionist mechanisms
It might also be useful to illustrate a selectionist and a generative mechanism to solve the same
problem of determining one among the 8 = 23 options considered in the last section. The eight
possible outcomes might be represented as:
|000〉, |100〉, |010〉, |110〉, |001〉, |101〉, |011〉, |111〉.
11
In the selectionist scheme, all eight variants are in some sense actualized or realized in the initial
state S0 so that a fitness criterion or evaluation metric (as in the FS scheme) can operate on them.
Some variants do better and some worse as indicated by the type size in Figure 9.
Figure 9: An abstract model of a selectionist learning mechanism
Eventually the ”unfit” options dwindle, atrophy, or die off leaving the most fit option |010〉 as the
final steady state Ss.
In the generative learning scheme, the initial state S0 is where all the switches are in neutral
so all the eight potential outcomes are in a ”superposition” state indicated by the plus signs in the
following Figure 10.
Figure 10: An abstract model of a generative learning mechanism
We assume that the initial experience sets the first switch (or first parameter in the P&P model) to
the left option which reduces the state to |000〉+ |100〉+ |010〉+ |110〉 (where the plus signs between
these options indicate that the second and third switches are still in neutral). Then subsequent
experience sets the second switch to the right option and the third switch to the left option. Thus
we reach the same outcome |010〉 as the final state Ss in the two models but by quite different
mechanisms.
We have now differentiated a selectionist (U → S) mechanism from a generative (0 → pi)
mechanism at a very abstract logico-mathematical level.
There is a whole literature where ”selectionist” is interpreted very broadly as non-instructionist
so that the generative (0 → pi) mechanism is also described in those overly-broad terms as being
”selectionist” (e.g., by describing the generative mechanism as ”selecting” switch-settings).
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I suggest that some important lessons for linguistics and cognitive science can, in-
deed, be drawn from contemporary biology, but that the new principles and the new
assumptions came to bury learning by instruction and to replace It with learning by se-
lection, a radically different process. What now replaces learning everywhere in biology
has nothing to do with a transfer of structure and everything to do with mechanisms
of internal selection and filtering affecting a pre-programmed chain of multiple internal
recombinations and internal ”switches.” [33, p. 3]
Now we see that this sort of setting of internal switches is better described as a generative
(0 → pi) mechanism whereas many of the other ”learning” mechanisms in biology (e.g., in the
immune system) are correctly described as a selectionist (U → S) mechanism since the latter involves
the actualization of some ”universal” repertoire of possibilities some of which are selected.
A hierarchy of genetic switches as in a stem cell or in embryonic development would be a gen-
erative mechanism ([30], [19]). One might imagine a hypothetical selectionist mechanism to replace
stem cells that would postulate low concentrations of the different types of cells through the body, so
that, say, muscle cells would be selected to multiply in a muscle environment while the other types
of cells would be inactive there. Yet what is found biologically is not that type of selectionist mech-
anism but the generative mechanism of stem cells (where the muscle environment sets the switches
to produce a muscle cell–in addition to reproducing the stem cell).
Peter Metawar [28] explains the selectionist-instructionist juxtaposition by contrasting a jukebox
(with the musical records taken as internal) with a record player (with the records taken as external).
The jukebox has a set of pre-existing options one of which is selected by the simple pushing of a
button whereas when a record player plays music, the set of external instructions must be supplied
in the form of a record. Thus a jukebox is a genuine selectionist (U → S) mechanism. Medawar also
describes the development of the embryo as being selectionist:
Embryonic development. . . must therefore be an unfolding of pre-existing capabilities,
an acting-out of genetically encoded instructions; the inductive stimulus is the agent that
selects or activates one set of instructions rather than another. [29, p. 295]
But in terms of our differentiation, embryonic development is a generative (0→ pi), not a selectionist
(U → S), mechanism. In a similar manner, it is easy to see that Gerald Edelman’s [11] various models
of brain development and learning are all selectionist (U → S) mechanisms.
In this manner, one could go over all the examples broadly called ”selectionist” and see which
were genuinely selectionist (U → S) mechanisms and which were generative (0 → pi) mechanisms–
which shows the surprising fruitfulness of the quite abstract logico-mathematical differentiation
between U → S and 0→ pi mechanisms.
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